Multilateral Environmental Agreements Biodiversity
In previous sections, we have developed a non-cooperative game theory model of an IEA for the preservation of biodiversity. To do this, we have developed a series of hypotheses to simplify the evaluation of the coalition`s stability analysis. In this section, we describe possible extensions of the model, in which some of these assumptions are rejected. We look at the following extensions: (1) an alternative theoretic approach to the analysis of coalition stability, (2) the integration of empirical results into the theoretical model and (3) the use of alternative hypotheses for our species protection model. Without transmissions, the maximum size of a stable coalition for this scenario is also “s” – 2. There are a total of 65 stable coalitions that are all possible coalitions of 2 members, with the exception of the C11 and C12 coalitions. Coalitions with the largest payment are those where C11 or C12 joins. In such cases, singletons with a “bar” q “) retain 30% of their talents, and the signatory with the lower value “bar” maintains about 37% of his talents; while the singleton with the “bar” q superior (C11 or C12) retains almost half of his talents, while the signatory with superior talent retains about 56% of his talents. We find that countries with a higher biodiversity foundation retain a greater share of their bar share than countries that have a lower biodiversity foundation; whether they act as signatories or as singletons. We insert this result on the hyperbolic form of the cost function: the marginal cost of conservation is reduced as the conservation ceiling becomes high. Finus and Rebbelke (2013) incorporate local (secondary) benefits into the standard two-stage set of climate change agreements. In one of their examples, they consider a payment function with linear local and global benefits and quadratic costs.
To study the integration of local benefits of biodiversity protection into our model, we use the Finus and R-bbelke (2013) model as a reference, but we use hyperbolic cost functions instead of the frequently used square cost functions, as previously explained. The country`s payment function is: Weikard, H.-P. (2002). Diversity works and the value of biodiversity. Rural economy, 78 (1), 20-27. doi:10.3368/le.78.1.20. Chander, P., Tulkens, H. (1997). The nucleus of an economy with multilateral environmental exteriors. International Journal of Game Theory, 26 (3), 379-401. Barrett, S., Stavins, R.
(2003). Increase participation and compliance with international climate change agreements. International Environmental Agreements, 3 (4), 349-376. The results of the scenarios suggest that Scenario II highlights the most important potential benefits of cooperation and conservation in terms of transfer integration. Even if the maximum size of a stable coalition does not change if transfers are included, all countries are prepared to transfer some of their profits individually to the country that has the highest biodiversity foundation (C12) to ensure that it is part of a two-member agreement. The 2-member coalitions that contain C12 have the best payment in the world. It is not surprising that trade is more efficient if the countries concerned are different. Different characteristics distinguish the case of biodiversity conservation from the classic model of reducing emissions. First, biodiversity is unevenly distributed among countries. Each country has different and finite biodiversity equipment and, as a result, the impact of conservation efforts within a country is limited.